Scholarly attempts to explain aid subversion in post-conflict contexts frame the challenge in terms of corrupt practices and transactions disconnected from local power struggles. Also, they assume a distinction between organised crime and the state. This comparative analysis of aid subversion in Colombia and Afghanistan reveals the limits of such an approach. Focusing on relations that anchor organised crime within local political, social and economic processes, we demonstrate that organised crime is dynamic, driven by multiple motives, and endogenous to local power politics. Better understanding of governance arrangements around the organised crime-conflict nexus which enable aid subversion is therefore required.
initiative in Urabá in Colombia, and private security contracting along the Southern drug trafficking route (henceforth Southern route) in Afghanistan. We go beyond the 'sub-unit' analytical level and reflect on the broader theoretical implications that explain aid subversion. 11 Our empirical evidence is built on primary literature consisting of court transcripts, government reports, expert specialised reports and local media sources, combined with extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan and Colombia involving semi-structured interviews with a range of interviewees (including officials and civil society representatives) and ethnographic observation. Systematic triangulation of a variety of data sources enhances the validity of the empirical evidence.
The article first looks at how the issue of organised crime is addressed in the international aid and peace-building literature. We identify gaps in this literature, and tackle them in the empirical part of the article. Comparative analysis of Colombia and Afghanistan traces the evolution of the links between a drug economy and armed conflict, with a focus on political and social relations. Studies of aid subversion of the oil palm initiative in Urabá, Colombia, and private security contracting in the provinces of Southern Afghanistan provide evidence for an alternative explanation of international aid subversion.
International aid and organised crime in post-conflict countries
Subversion of international aid in the form of corruption surfaced as an academic and policy issue in the late 1980s, 12 though it remains a rare object of scholarly inquiry. 13 The topic is addressed by two literatures: on international aid and peace-building 14 and on fragile states.
The former mirrors the mainstream debates on aid, as evidenced by research themes such as effectiveness, ownership, conditionality, modes of implementation, impact on governance and development, and anti-corruption policies. 15 In this literature on international aid and peace-building, there is a consensus that corruption facilitates criminality, and vice versa. 16 The research strives to disentangle various facets of this dynamic, in which international aid plays an integral part. In analytical terms, the interaction between organised crime and state actors is the central focus. 17 A parallel preoccupation with aid subversion in the fragile state literature attributes the prevalence of corruption to conflict-affected countries' weak state capacity, which is often compounded by domestic elites' lack of political will. 18 A subset of this body of scholarship, with roots in the three inter-related academic fields of post-colonial studies, democratic transition and hybrid political orders, breaks through the limitation imposed by the normativity of the concept of corruption alongside its state-centred focus. In this work, state weakness is traced to informal (hidden) power structures that straddle political, economic and administrative spheres and public and private domains and their actors, and merge local and transnational dynamics. 19 Although this strand of literature lends itself to more astute analysis of subversion of international aid by organised crime in post-conflict contexts, it does not explicitly address organised crime per se.
In sum, the study of international aid and peace-building in the context of corruption has three weaknesses that limit its potential to explain the mechanics of international aid subversion by organised crime in post-conflict contexts. It is static, transaction-focused, and views organised crime as exogenous to local power struggles unleashed by armed violence.
Even in recent attempts to construct an analytical framework fit for the post-conflict 
Organised crime and conflict actors
Colombia's increasing strength in the drugs production phase was an important factor in the transformation of drug-related organised crime structures. Peripheral areas were traditionally beyond the reach of the state and its anti-narcotics policies, the enforcement of which required huge investment in public security, protection and regulation. This motivated the left-wing Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and right-wing
United Self-Defence of Colombia (AUC) and their massive armies to join the drug economy, managing massive requisite labour force, securing the expansion of plantations, and protecting crops from competitors and the government eradication efforts. By the 2000s, the paramilitaries and guerrillas fully controlled coca-leaf production and processing and were involved in trafficking. Specialisation in the production phase was an important source of war finance for both forces.
33
Unlike FARC, the origins and evolution of the AUC were steeped in crime rather than war. At their inception in the early 1980s, the paramilitary groups operated as drug barons' private security guards. Their only organisational glue was an anti-guerrilla discourse, while they pursued private agendas related, among other things, to drugs trafficking, 34 
Paramilitaries' political and social relations
Unlike guerrillas who aimed at overthrowing the state, the paramilitaries sought, as they spelled out during the first AUC national conference, to reclaim and not replace the state. 37 The AUC's links with state actors were ambivalent; while officially adversaries, they were tacit collaborators. 38 In many central and northern regions the paramilitaries operated through informal arrangements with rural rich, politicians, military leaders and drug traffickers, affected by the guerrilla violence and threatened by democratising reforms. The military and police 'subcontracted' informally counter-insurgent tasks to paramilitaries and charged them with eliminating demand from the peasantry for more democratic access to land, as well as with eliminating political opponents and alleged guerrilla members.
But the AUC did not exclusively expand and act 'on demand'. The AUC's territorial expansion and actions reflected its commanders' own political, military and economic agendas. 39 This intersection whereby the agendas of strategic territorial actors met those of paramilitaries is known in Colombia as 'parapolitics'. 40 In 1997 40 In -2007 , these alliances between the AUC and elected and appointed politicians enabled the AUC to control local electoral processes, to divert hundreds of millions of dollars from public coffers (including international aid) and penetrate into the judiciary and security agencies.
Taking over territories also entailed a social integration strategy. An important share of the middle class in the AUC-controlled regions supported paramilitary action as a means to neutralise guerrillas. In contrast, the majority of people in the lower strata of society were forced either to integrate or be excluded. 41 The local economy and politics were violently reorganised to maximise the income of the communities they dominated, and, hence, secure clienteles. 42 The AUC accumulated land by dispossessing and forcibly displacing peasants (alleged guerrilla supporters) and repopulating whole areas with 'loyal' social bases.
Newcomers were integrated into a new political project, as illustrated by an AUC commander's statement that 'we subsidise peasants and provide technical support through our people […] and we distribute the land. They owe us this'. 43 Such relationships turned the rural and urban poor and the coca labour force into important clienteles that benefited from the paramilitaries' ability to capitalise on their need for welfare provision. The social base was widened for the paramilitary governance project, in which criminal and legal actors and resources comingled and blended, providing a context for aid subversion through official procedures.
Regional dynamics in Urabá
The Urabá region, which occupies a large part of the Antioquia, Cordoba and Chocó Departments in northwestern Colombia, is considered the cradle of the AUC. Violence and crime in Urabá have been particularly prevalent from the mid-20 th century and have intertwined with an internal colonization process. This territory's strategic location along the Caribbean coast and the frontier line with Panama, with natural seaports on the Pacific and Caribbean seas, mountainous systems, rain forest, and many other resources crystallised local elites' goals of consolidating agro-industrial expansion and securing a coastal exit for international trade. 44 The opening of the internal frontier in Urabá introduced the first wave of land structure modification via land plundering from its originate occupants (native, Afro-Colombian and mestizo peasants). Urabá constituted the ideal setting for an uncontrolled land accumulation process. The lack of state regulation over land property was addressed with policies that promoted the establishment of agroindustrial systems of banana and oil palm production and employment in the 1920s and mid-1930s. 45 Over time, the growing landless peasantry pushed for the internal frontier's further opening or became plantations workers. Working conditions were characterised by contentious labour relations. In this context, the internal conflict started in the mid-1960s, accompanied by the emergence of left wing guerrillas. Drug traffickers and paramilitaries joined the conflict in the 1980s.
As part of a massive counter-insurgent campaign against FARC, the paramilitaries pursued a strategy of assassinating farmers and/or violently expropriating their land. By 1997, paramilitaries had transformed the agrarian structure of the northern Urabá region from small and mid-sized rural properties to latifundia, all owned by paramilitaries through complex chains of front men. 46 They also protected many agro-industrial farms -including those of multinational firms in large plantation areas. 47 While they supported local politicians, the AUC's next step was to organise the rest of the community and the loyal people they brought from other places to re-populate the region.
Oil palm: The new opportunity for criminal accumulation
The oil palm sector has been promoted in Colombia as a means of agricultural modernisation in peripheral regions, such as Urabá, which have received substantial funding from international agencies. In Urabá in the late 1990s the AUC violently dispossessed AfroColombian communities of parts of their legally protected collective territories in the basins of the Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó rivers in order to expand oil palm plantations and secure drug traffic. Local public notaries and officials from the regional land authority facilitated this process. 48 The AUC then turned to a novel channel to divert international aid: civil society and grassroots organizations.
In the early 2000s, 'El Alemán' -the AUC's 'Elmer Cardenas Bloc' (ECB) --supported by key public and private actors in Urabá, created a social movement called 'Popular Peasant Power' (Poder Popular Campesino) and trained a group of wounded AUC privates to act as development promoters for community and co-operative work and citizen oversight activities. 49 The Bloc controlled the election of thousands of communal action councils (juntas de acción communal) in neighbourhood-and county-level associations that allowed citizens to participate in local development decision-making and public performance oversight. These councils became the incubators for paramilitary-controlled town councils.
The Bloc designated candidates in each county and neighbourhood. 50 In the mayoral elections, each municipality in Urabá generally had two candidates (in order to avoid over- According to Verdad Abierta, the contracts that could be traced back were worth approximately US$800,000.
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The final stage in the process was the creation in 2006 of the 'Social Alternative Project' (Proyecto de Alternatividad Social -PASO), which was the backbone of the ECB's demobilisation process. 'El Alemán' used PASO as a platform to develop productive community projects. The paramilitaries provided the land, and the displaced peasants returning to the region and demobilised privates became the labour force for oil palm, rubber, banana and reforestation projects. 55 Oil palm is profitable only when produced on a large scale, or by linking small producers to larger ones. Hence, it is a business better suited to large investors and/or big landowners. The Colombian government and international agencies, such as USAID, have sought to support small palm growers in supply chains. The unintended effect of these efforts was a rapid expansion of oil palm as a source of extraordinary economic benefits, and consequently political influence, for criminal actors. Thanks to its elaborate system of relations with various actors around the Urabá oil palm industry and state actors across multiple layers of government, the AUC gained access to significant funding from the national government and the international community and became involved in highly profitable legal activities.
Afghanistan
International aid has a long history in Afghanistan and, since the fall of the Taliban, has played a major role in the stabilisation of the country. 56 Driven by security imperatives, aid has focused on counter-insurgency, which has overshadowed humanitarian and development assistance. The militarisation of aid entailed tolerance towards the involvement the local allies --their commanders and militiamen --in the drug economy. 57 Furthermore, the decentralised aid management made aid funds vulnerable to misuse via loose structure of informal networks including actors in the drug economy.
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Organised crime and conflict actors
Opium production in Afghanistan has expanded steadily during the 1980s and 1990s, 59 from relatively modest levels reaching unprecedented cultivation levels in 2014. 60 This expansion was driven first by a need to sustain the anti-Soviet struggle, and later by the civil war.
Consequently, the evolution of the drug economy became intimately connected with conflict dynamics and the changing role of non-state armed groups. 61 However, he expansion of the drug economy ought to be understood beyond the motivation associated with violent entrepreneurship.
In Afghanistan's predominantly rural economy, decades of war decimated local agriculture. It shifted to labour-intensive poppy growing that, for many, was a 'low risk activity in high risk environment'. 62 The Taliban's support for poppy cultivation was a key source of its legitimacy in poppy-growing areas. 63 reflecting the central state's inability to assert its authority over regional power holders with an independent economic resource base in the drug economy.
Warlords' political and social relations
A spectrum of non-state armed groups called 'warlords' 67 proliferated during the anti-Soviet jihad. The identities and roles of these militias have changed over time. A sub-set of warlords, known as the mujahidin warlords, 68 challenged the Soviet-backed regime and its particular vision for the Afghan state. Lacking a common vision of a new state, they turned on each other in a civil war over control over the government in Kabul. 69 Fighting coincided with the warlords' increasing involvement in drug trafficking. This involvement not only helped the warlords' secure resources and recruitment, but also enabled various individuals and groups to pursue their particular commercial interests. 70 During the counter-insurgency, many of the mujahidin warlords reappeared as the international troops' main allies, claiming legitimacy as anti-Taliban forces. For example, these warlords were behind the 2001 ouster of the Taliban in Kandahar the second largest province in terms of poppy production. This effort was spearheaded by the province's mujahidin-era governor and one of the country's three most powerful warlords. 71 Many mujahidin warlords who were involved in the drug economy 72 entered the political process.
They filled ministries, district and provincial offices, the Afghan army and the police corps, while mobilising 'multiple relational bonds' 73 to family, ethnic kin, traditional authorities and local state institutions, as elaborated below.
Regional Dynamics in the Southern Provinces
The drug economy diversified most in the southern provinces of Afghanistan -Kandahar, Uruzgan 74 and Helmand -where poppy cultivation and trafficking in the border areas were most widespread and resilient, surviving into the internationally led post-war recovery phase. The transformation of the drug economy was linked to the emergence of a new generation of warlords who had kinship ties to the mujahidin warlords. Their rule was violent and coercive in most cases, with warlords often forcibly demanding that farmers grow poppy. 75 In Kandahar, large swaths of government land were seized and distributed to the warlords' loyal commanders. 76 They mostly dispensed their power partially favouring groups linked to them in the provision of protection and livelihoods. However, in some cases, warlord rule provided a degree of stability and order. 77 In the post-Taliban period, the militarisation of aid empowered the new generation of warlords, many of whom were key allies in counter-insurgency efforts. However, within Kandahar and Uruzgan, these warlords were perceived as modern 'Robin Hoods of Afghanistan,' 78 who distributed the wealth to the poorer layers of society.
Warlord rule in the Southern route
The Southern route refers to the road running from the Spin Boldak border crossing with Pakistan, via the city of Kandahar, to the town of Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan Province. It was heavily used as a drug trafficking corridor, particularly after heroin plants emerged along the road to the Pakistani border. Opium from Helmand and Uruzgan, as well as from further afield, was transported along this road for processing. At one point during the civil war, some 20 armed groups were involved in this trafficking, imposing various taxes and controlling the drug trade. 79 According to one account, the three-and-a-half-hour drive from Spin Boldak to Kandahar involved crossing 24 checkpoints manned by those groups. 80 PostTaliban, the Southern route along with Highway 1, which branches off north to connect Kandahar to Kabul and south to connect Kandahar to Hirat, was a vital path for supplies destined for international forces in Afghanistan. This road network passes through three provinces that were (at the start of the US invasion) and remain the biggest producers of opium poppy, including Kandahar, the Taliban's heartland. This status made these provinces the most insecure part of the country, requiring a massive operation to protect supply convoys destined for international troops. Watan Risk Management, was providing security for 96,000 trucks a year and charging US$1,500 per truck. 88 The head of Afghan customs, Bismullah Kammawie, claimed in conversation with American officers that corruption at the Spin Boldak border post was 'total.' 89 This comment indicates that an intricate endogenous network sustained its power by utilising international aid and combining it with drug trafficking activities.
Analysis
We set out to study what kinds of mechanisms based on the mobilisation of institutional, social and individual relations account for subversion of international aid in conflict contexts where organised crime plays a prominent role. An inter-regional comparative analysis of Colombia and Afghanistan shows how regressive sub-national governance enables aid subversion through institutional processes. We point to a need to understand the integration of organised crime into the governing structures, a process that in both cases was consequential despite the varying political contexts, conflict/crime trajectories, and drug economy types. While the AUC originated in organised crime activities around the drug economy, the southern warlords originated in armed conflict. Neither the paramilitaries nor the warlords, who nominally are non-state conflict actors, set out to challenge the state. In contrast, they performed important counter-insurgency functions for the state, suggesting a complex, mutual relationship.
In both cases, a convergence of organised crime and armed groups over the conflict cycle gave rise to a system of rule in which engagement in the drug economy served a variety of functions. These functions correspond to the changing objectives and motivations of multiple constituencies, including the state actors themselves, and sections of the respective populations. Through this process, both Colombia's paramilitaries and Afghanistan's southern warlords developed political, economic and social ties that gave them power and influence that they were disinclined to relinquish when faced with the prospect of conflict termination.
Transition from an open conflict produced two types of local governance arrangements: an arm's-length cohabitation with the state in the case of Colombia's paramilitaries, and incorporation into the state of Afghanistan's southern warlords. Both actors have been able to use the multiple links solidified through the engagement in the drug economy to secure access to public office. Such institutional positioning has allowed them to tap into international aid flows using official processes and institutional means, as demonstrated by the oil palm and private security contracting cases. The route to public office led through a parallel process of social embedding, as criminal-cum-conflict actors developed a relationship with a broader social base. Lastly, their role mutation from criminals to officials was a formal exercise. In practice, they held on to old roles and links related to those roles.
The official political response, supported by international aid, was demobilisation of paramilitaries. In Colombia, the AUC was permitted to participate in the peace process; in Afghanistan, the warlords were co-opted into government structures. In both cases, armed actors' links to organised crime were treated as epi-phenomenal. Demobilisation and cooptation of these arms groups was not seen to be inconsistent with organised crime mitigation. Mitigating organised crime has remained part of the international counternarcotics agenda, in line with the narrow view of the role of organised crime in contemporary conflicts that remains influential among the international donors.
Conclusion
Our study of international aid subversion by organised crime in Colombia and Afghanistan has important theoretical, methodological and policy implications. Our key finding is that organised crime in conflict contexts is a dynamic phenomenon that lends itself to different configurations on different governmental, spatial and temporal scales. Hence, our analytical metrics needed to be adjusted accordingly. Prevailing scholarly discourses, which view organised crime and the state as static and separate, weaken our ability to fully grasp the trajectories of the organised crime/conflict/governance nexus and its implications for international aid. Foremost, political aspirations of organised crime actors in conflict, which are key to how they relate to the state and military power, ought to be fully integrated into conceptual frameworks for studying aid subversion.
Our evidence demonstrates that informal power systems established around the organised crime/conflict nexus are diverse, dynamic and resilient as well as path-dependent and context-specific. Therefore, their ability to interfere and subvert international aid using institutional means cannot be grasped appropriately within a corruption perspective, which treats the role of organised crime in the peace-building process as static, transactionfocused and exogenous to the local politics of power.
Instead, mechanisms of aid subversion can be gleaned from a systematic study of the ties among the multiple actors operating at the organised crime/conflict interface and the structures and interactions around them, and alongside their transformation over time.
From the international aid perspective, rather than focusing on institutions per se, scholars must investigate how those structures and linkages are configured in relation to governance processes more broadly. There is currently a glaring gap in the empirical evidence in this respect. 90 More evidence is necessary to further develop a critique of the dominant framing of organised crime and international aid to post-conflict countries as a problem of corruption both in scholarly and policy approaches.
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